

A Process Oriented View of Conflict Resolution

By Stanford Siver

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68

古之。善為士者不武。善戰者
不怒。善勝敵者不與。善用
人者為之下。是謂不爭之德
。是謂用人之力。是謂配天
。古之極。

In ancient times
the perfect officer wasn't armed
the perfect warrior wasn't angry
the perfect victor wasn't hostile
the perfect commander acted humble
this is the virtue of nonaggression
this is using the strength of others
this is uniting with Heaven
which was the ancient end

(Lao-tzu, 1996, p. 136)

The Roots of Conflict Resolution¹

The roots of conflict resolution extend back at least as far as the Greek city states and the Roman Empire with the use of third party mediation in international relations (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2004, p. 34). Texts such as the Sun Tzu's "Art of War" (1988) and Carl von Clausewitz's "On War" (1993) focus on conflict resolution, peace, and stability from a military perspective. Contributions from psychology began with frustration-aggression, social, and political theories in the 1930s and 40s (Miall et al., 2004, p. 41). The field was further shaped by the political philosophy of Machiavelli, Malthus, and Hobbes; by spirituality in the prophetic traditions of Jesus, Mohammad, Gandhi (1942; 1964; 2000), Dr. King (1963; 1967; 1986), and Nelson Mandela (1995); by the physics of Einstein (1954b) and David Bohm (2004); and now includes the foundational work in conflict theory and practice of Galtung (1987; 2001; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002; 1995), Azar, Ikeda (Galtung & Ikeda, 1995; 2004), Burton (1996), Ury (Fisher & Ury, 1991; 1999), Lederach (1999; 2003), McDonald (1991; 1987), and many others.

Conflict resolution developed as a field in the 1950s during the early days of the cold war and the tumultuous times of the 1960s. It became increasingly clear in those times that the existing authoritarian methods of deterrence weren't working on foreign or domestic levels. This paper approaches conflict resolution through the work of a few

¹ Rather than confusing the reader by using one of several obscure systems of gender neutral pronouns, alternating between masculine or feminine pronouns, or tediously using both out of a sense of political correctness, I have chosen to use feminine pronouns throughout, except where clearly referring to a specific male person.

contemporary practitioners and writers and explores the basic approaches to conflict, analysis, and resolution found in the major paradigms.

The continued occurrence of human devastation because of mismanaged conflict makes a compelling case for further study of conflict. An estimated 175,000,000 people died in the last century in what former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski called “lives deliberately extinguished by politically motivated carnage” (1993, p. 17). Countless more have suffered and died in conflicts due to miscommunication, misunderstanding, challenges to security, identity, recognition, ideology, greed, family dynamics, money, sexism, racism, classism, homophobia, and environmental marginalization:

Every day four women die in this country as a result of domestic violence, the euphemism for murders and assaults by husbands and boyfriends. That's approximately 1,400 women a year, according to the FBI. The number of women who have been murdered by their intimate partners is greater than the number of soldiers killed in the Vietnam War.

Although only 572,000 reports of assault by intimates are officially reported to federal officials each year, the most conservative estimates indicate two to four million [one every 7.9 seconds] women of all races and classes are battered each year. At least 170,000 of those violent incidents are serious enough to require hospitalization, emergency room care or a doctor's attention. (National Organization for Women, 2003)

Similar statistics document casualties in war, trauma, conflict, and oppression involving many factors. And yet, even without these tragedies, the suffering caused by everyday conflicts in normal daily interactions is already too much.

The field of conflict resolution explores the nature of conflict on many levels: interpersonal, family, organizational, community, intrastate, international, and global. There are both similarities and differences in the nature of conflict in these levels. This paper primarily explores violent and intractable conflict at the intrastate, international, and global levels.

Conflict Paradigms

There are many different approaches to conflict resolution. Some say that “we should all just learn to get along” but don’t say how to bring that about. Some say that love is the answer but haven’t demonstrated a workable approach to bringing about that transformation. Others say the key to unlocking the intractable nature of conflict in the present is to look to the past. Some say that the solution to intractable conflict hasn’t been found in the past and won’t be, so we must look only in the present. Some say the universe is holographic, that space-time is non-local, and thus there is no difference between past, present, and future. Some say that the solution is for everyone to look within, to see the seeds of their own violence, and to be present in each moment. Others say that conflicts are merely a worldly manifestation of complex forces that exist in a separate reality—various paradigms describe these forces shamanically, archetypally, as social forces, as quantum fields, or as the Tao. Some say that leaders should agree on accords and compromises and that people will follow, while others say that leaders are merely figures and the people and the spirit of the times must be moved to agree first. Some say the problems are economic

and resource based; others say they are cultural. Some maintain that education, media control, and punishment are the best way to control the dissident behaviors of those in conflict and to maintain the balance of power.

One view of conflict maintains that its resolution involves a growth process: If the parties to the conflict were more conscious, they could work through tension towards a resolution or at least a settlement. On the other hand, others suggest that even rational, conscious people may disagree and those disagreements may evolve into conflicts due to diverse outside events and pressures. In short, no one really knows much of anything about conflict or its resolution with any certainty. However, looking back over the first fifty years of conflict resolution as a formal field:

. . . realists saw conflict resolution as soft-headed and unrealistic, since in their view international politics is a struggle between antagonistic and irreconcilable groups, in which power and coercion were the ultimate currency. Might not lasting peace more often result from decisive military victory than from negotiated settlement? And might not third party intervention merely prolong the misery? The ideological preconceptions of some of those working in the peace research and conflict resolution field were regarded as compromising, and the attempt to combine “scientific” academic analysis with a normative political agenda as intellectually suspect. From a different angle, neo-Marxists and radical thinkers from development studies saw the whole conflict resolution enterprise as misconceived, since it attempted to reconcile interests that should not be reconciled, failed to take sides in unequal and unjust struggles, and lacked an analysis within a properly

global perspective of the forces of exploitation and oppression. (Miall et al., 2004, p. 3)

Post WWII & Cold War Trends in Professional Conflict Resolution

The first professional institution of peace and conflict research appeared in 1945. The Peace Research Laboratory (PRL) in St Louis, Missouri, was created after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “Science, according to [PRL founder, Theodore F.] Lentz, ‘did increase physical power but science did not increase physical harmony. . . the power-harmony imbalance has been brought about by science in disorder’ (Lentz, 1955, 52-3)” (Miall et al., 2004, p. 42). The work of Johan Galtung—a Norwegian peace researcher and winner of the Right Livelihood, which is known as the alternative Nobel peace prize—extended the field from the research of the reduction of war to the emergence of peace (Galtung & Fischer, 2002; Galtung & Ikeda, 1995).

During the 1950s and 1960s, the decolonizing wars of liberation tended to be ideological, nationalistic struggles for identity and self-determination. There was then a gradual shift to post-colonial, internal civil wars in successor states. These were categorized as: non-authority-oriented, anti-colonial, secessionist, indigenous control of authority structures, external imposition of authority structures, and Cold War sponsored. Miall, et al, maintain that the anti-colonial and Cold War sponsored conflicts have faded from the list (2004, p. 71). However, tensions in the Caucasus (such as the Georgian Revolution of the Roses in 2004 and recent events in the Ukraine) are remnants of the Soviet Cold War domination, relate to contemporary Russian imperial desires, and are also pro and anti-colonial; depending upon which faction one sides with.

Edward Azar's theory of protracted social conflict builds on post Cold War, post colonial trends in conflict. The critical factor in protracted social conflict is that it considers the basic needs of security, identity, recognition, acceptance, and access to political and economic participation (Miall et al., 2004, p. 71).

Authority vs Chaos & the United Nations

Historical patterns wherein the norms, laws, and punishment were dictated by a ruling elite are giving way to more democratic structures. These advances bring along with them a weakening of enforcement possibilities (Burton, 1996). The traditional authoritarian view of society is that the privileged members of society set the norms and the state uses its power to enforce conformance within the state and to protect the state's interests from encroaching nations. Democratization broadens the social norms and challenges society and the state to accept greater diversity. Nature may love diversity, but societies and states appear to loath it.

The state's technological advances have failed to counter the trends towards greater diversity of thought, culture, and action. At the same time, technological advances have also made it possible for individuals to have increasingly powerful impact on world order. For example, consider such incidents as the inept but miraculously successful assassination of Archduke Ferdinand (which sparked WWI), "terrorist" bombings, anthrax fear, 9/11, and the possibility that a nuclear weapon will eventually be used by a small group.

John Burton maintains that "the traditional coercive basis of law and order on which societies have rested is no longer effective" (1996, p. 3). Reliance on authority, prisons, and weapons is decreasingly effective while the same means of repression provide increased opportunity for defiance. One view maintains that authoritarian control and

punishment, which worked in the past, merely needs to be redoubled, modernized, and made more efficient: hence the reliance in the US on increased prisons, decreasing diversity of the press, and advanced weaponry. Furthermore, the nature of the challenge to authority and the status quo is inherently threatening to those in power as well as to those who rely on the state to provide stability. If the state is forced to change and become self-reflective and open to critical thinking, what will guarantee stability?

Any rejection of social norms, and resistance to authorities whose duty it is to enforce them, have traditionally been held to be immoral and unethical, being a failure to observe those values supported by religions and cultural belief systems. Any suggestion that there may be valid reasons for divergences, any suggestion that existing institutions and structures may themselves be a source of crime and violence requiring, therefore, fundamental changes, is too challenging to those who value traditional institutions. . . . Rather than change, they prefer the option of increased security measures provided by authorities . . . (Burton, 1996, p. 3)

The authoritarian system views the struggle as one against chaos. Marxist, socialist, and anarchist thought is easily discredited as a utopian ideal partly because of historical reality but also because the traditional authorities see individuals as being “wholly malleable and . . . capable of conforming with institutional requirements” (Burton, 1996, p. 4).

Burton argues that this assumption is false, that deterrence does not reliably deter, and small nations can not be defeated by greater nations if the defeat forces conformance.

However, Burton argues this based on his own assumption that “there may be a limit to the human capacity to adapt, leading to resistance to the point of self-sacrifice” (1996, p. 4). To base this dynamic on a limitation of the human capacity to adapt is to deny the spirit and

power of those who will not submit to oppression. Did Gandhi fail to adapt to British Imperialism or did he succeed in standing against it?

The horrors of World War II led to the formation of the United Nations. The UN's existence is based on an assumption that its authority will prevent chaos. However, despite great efforts in many areas, the UN has failed to intervene in numerous atrocities and wars and does little to enforce the wonderful rhetoric of its own Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).

In August of 2004 at the fifty ninth session of the UN General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, released a report titled "Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration." The report included the following statement: "The end of occupation and the formal restoration of Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004 marked a new phase in Iraq's transitional process" (Annan, 2004). The statement can be said to be true in only the most profoundly shallow and bureaucratic sense. The occupation of Iraq has not ended for the Iraqi people nor for the US soldiers operating there.

Burton describes deterrence, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, as a failed policy whose failure had become increasingly clear by the 1960s:

Until the early 1960s there was no questioning [in the minds of some policy makers] of the proposition that *deterrence* deters. Foreign and domestic law-and-order policies were based on this assumption. Failures in deterrent strategies were attributed to inadequate employment of threat and coercion. The empirical evidence (e.g. the defeat of great powers by small powers or persistent street violence in societies) and then some years later a theory suggesting that behavior was not wholly malleable, led to a questioning of this assumption. It is this

realization that deterrence does not reliably deter that led to the consideration of options, and especially the analytical approach to specific situations of conflict and to conflict “provention” by appropriate changes in policies and in institutions.

(1996, p. 26)

It was clear by the end of the 1960s that a deeper understanding of conflict was still needed and policy makers and theorists began a practice of conflict analysis.

Conflict Analysis and Resolution

During the 1970’s a body of literature describing the then developing theory and practice of conflict analysis and resolution evolved. “Resolution was seen as possible, not through goodwill and an altered value system, but by a realistic analysis of situations and an assessment of the costs and consequences of policies that were based on false assumptions and perceptions” (Burton, 1996, p. 4). Conflicts were examined at all social levels, analytical tools evolved, and research and training institutions were established. Clear patterns emerged of the sources and types of conflict, the effects of various interventions, people’s visions for the future, and the need for cultural and ethnic identity and autonomy. A new language of conflict analysis and resolution was developed along with procedures for intervening in conflict.² A distinction was made between conflicts and disputes:

Conflict “A struggle between opposing forces that involve inherent human needs in respect of which there can be limited or no compliance, there being no unlimited malleability to make this possible” (Burton, 1996, p. 21).

“... the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups. . . . that involve human needs and can only be resolved by removing underlying causes” (Miall et al., 2004, p. 19-20).

² See the Processes of Conflict Resolution in Appendix One on page 48.

Dispute A disagreement, usually involving material considerations, that can be settled by some form of negotiation, compromise, meditation, or legal process. (Burton, 1996, p. 26)

Similar precision was given to terms such as mediation and resolution. Resolution, for example, may mean sending in the police or the army to stop dissent—at least in the eyes of some people this may be resolution. To others, resolution involves a process of listening to the dissenting people, understanding their grievances, analyzing the interests of all parties involved, and helping them to work together to develop a practice of working with grievances in a sustainable manner. Burton offered the following definitions:

Resolution “Resolution within a power frame has the connotation of determination or firmness. Resolving has the connotation of bringing an argument to an end. Conflict resolution has quite different meaning. It implies problem solving by deeply analytical means. No element of coercion is implied.” (1996, p. 40)

Mediation “Mediation is an art. It varies greatly according to the belief systems of the mediator. If, in fact, the problem in relationships turns out to be a dispute, mediation can be successful. But frequently mediation does not reveal hidden issues, and mediators frequently do not have the training required to bring these to the surface. What appears to be a dispute can turn out to be a conflict and mediation in these circumstances can be dysfunctional.” (1996, p. 34)

Conflict Transformation

The term mediation is still widely but loosely used to refer to any intervention in a conflict or dispute. However, more formally, mediation most accurately refers to a process of negotiation and compromise applied to a dispute. Similarly, the term resolution is also widely used, but as Burton points out it has the connotation of determination, firmness, and of ending the argument. For many (generally the more marginalized groups in any given conflict) the term *resolution* carries negative connotations such as a danger of co-optation, efforts to silence dissenting views and people, or an attempt to ignore legitimate concerns and issues. John Paul Lederach prefers the term *transformation*, which he defines in a poem:

Conflict transformation is to *envision* and *respond*
to the *ebb* and *flow* of social conflict
as *life-giving opportunities*
for creating *constructive change processes*
that *reduce violence*,
increase justice
in *direct interaction and social structures*,
and respond to real-life problems
in *human relationships*. (2003, p. 14)

There is more at stake than the concrete issues that appear on the table. People in conflict are often negotiating the nature and quality of their relationships, their governance, their sense of self-worth and identity, and the nature of decision making and power. People often have profound physiological reactions when working with these issues, when confronted by their enemies, and when face to face with their histories and the ghosts of the past (Lederach, 2003). Lederach makes the following distinctions between conflict resolution and conflict transformation:

<i>Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation: A Brief Comparison of Perspective</i>		
	Conflict Resolution	Conflict Transformation
The Key Question	How do we end something not desired?	How do we end something destructive and build something desired?
The focus	It is content-centered.	It is relationship-centered.
The purpose	To achieve an agreement and solution to the presenting problem creating the crisis.	To promote constructive change processes, inclusive of, but not limited to, immediate solutions.
The development of the process	It is embedded and built around the immediacy of the relationship where the symptoms of disruptions appear.	It envisions the presenting problem as an opportunity for response to symptoms and engagement of systems within which relationships are embedded.
Time frame	The horizon is short-term relief to pain, anxiety, and difficulties.	The horizon for change is mid- to long-range and is intentionally crisis-responsive rather than crisis-driven.
View of conflict	It envisions the need to de-escalate conflict processes.	It envisions conflict as an ecology that is relationally dynamic with ebb and flow.

Table 1: Conflict Resolution vs. Transformation (Lederach, 2003, p. 33)

An enormous body of work is now available describing numerous models, analyzing interstate, intrastate, and regional conflicts, armed conflicts, ethnic conflict, and terrorism and the factors of resources, governance, sovereignty, power, control, and identity. For example, the following table outlines one typology of conflicts, broken down by region spanning a four year period:

<i>Major deadly conflicts by region and type: 1995-7</i>						
	Interstate	Revolution/Ideology	Identity/ Secession	Factional	Total	
Africa	0	3	8	2	13	
Asia	0	4	10	2	16	
Europe	0	0	7	1	8	

Latin America	0	3	0	1	4
Middle East	0	3	4	0	7

Table 2: Major deadly conflicts - 1995-7 (Miall et al., 2004, p. 80)

As shown by the data in this table, the nature of conflicts has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War and the break up of the European empires. Most conflicts are now intrastate conflicts. It is interesting to note, for example, that there were no ideological conflicts in Europe during this period but several in Africa and Asia. This data reflects the empirical work of conflict scientists, researchers, and policy analysts searching for answers through hard facts and quantitative data.

Conflict transformation’s approach has melded with the softer approaches of spiritual leaders, peace researchers, pacifists, and nonviolent Gandhian activists. “The objectives of Gandhi’s *satyagraha* (‘struggle for truth’) [or *truth force*, as it is sometimes described] were to make latent conflict manifest by challenging social structures that were harmful because they were highly inequitable, but to do this without setting off a spiral of violence” (Miall et al., 2004, p. 41). The objective from this framework is not to win, and not even necessarily to achieve what many practitioners now call a win-win solution, but to achieve a new level of understanding, relatedness, and a greater capacity for thinking together.

A related viewpoint comes from Buddhist thought: the seeds of conflict lie in the perceptions of experience, the values, and the attitudes of the conflicted parties. Conflict resolution from this perspective then becomes a path of self-awareness. This view has parallels in the ancient Greek edict to “know thyself,” in the spiritual practice and dogma of finding love and forgiveness, and, as will be described later, in the physics of David Bohm

and his theories of coherence and dialogue. All of these ideas have great merit, but it is the conflict professional who endeavors to research the practice, applicability, and efficacy of the various models and paradigms; seeking funding, run the day to day business of applying them; and seek answers to the remaining questions such as the following: Can the successes be generalized? Can methods developed in western settings be applied across cultural boundaries? Could Cold War practices be applied in post-Cold War, intrastate, or ethnic conflicts? How can conflicts be prevented through *proventive* measures while still latent?³

Ury's model of conflict escalation (see figure one) stresses the importance of early prevention:




Figure 1: Ury Model of Conflict Escalation (Ury, 1999, p. 113)

³ *Provention* was a popular word in the field in the 1960s. It refers to the proactive prevention of conflict by removing the causes of conflict, rather than ending conflict through coercion and deterrence. Burton saw it as a political philosophy that could be a general approach to government. (1996, p. 38)

As the field of conflict resolution developed, it became clear that there are no magic wands, no panacea, and no clear answers to conflict resolution. Each situation and every moment is unique. For example, consider an attempt at finding a simple description of the conflict in North Ireland:

1. The traditional nationalist interpretation: Britain v. Ireland

The Irish people form a single nation and the fault for keeping Ireland divided lies with Britain.

2. The traditional unionist interpretation: Southern Ireland v. Northern Ireland

There are two peoples in Ireland who have an equal right to self-determination, Protestant (unionist/loyalist) and Catholic (nationalist/republican), and the fault for perpetuating the conflict lies with the refusal of nationalists to recognize this.

3. Marxist interpretations: capitalist v. worker

The cause of the conflict lies in the combination of an unresolved imperial legacy and the attempt by a governing capitalist class to keep the working class repressed and divided.

4. Internal-conflict interpretations: Protestant v. Catholic within Northern Ireland

The cause of the conflict lies in the incompatibility between the aspirations of the two divided communities in Northern Ireland. (Miall et al., 2004, p. 67)

This description isn't meant to imply that there is one correct interpretation or that there is a single cause of any given conflict. It is clear that the complex multifaceted nature of conflict and the many views and tensions embedded within require an equally diverse approach to understanding and transforming the conflict. Attempts to apply systems thinking to conflict resolution led to the development of multi-track diplomacy as described in the following section.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

In 1981, Joseph Montville, then a US Department of State employee, coined the terms Track One and Track Two diplomacy in "Foreign Policy According to Freud," which appeared in *Foreign Policy* (Montville & Davidson, 1981). Track One diplomacy was what diplomats did: formal negotiations between nations conducted by professional diplomats. Track Two diplomacy referred to conflict resolution efforts by professional non-governmental conflict resolution practitioners and theorists. "Track Two has as its object the reduction or resolution of conflict, within a country or between countries, by lowering the anger or tension or fear that exists, through improved communication and a better understanding of each other's point of view" (McDonald & Bendahmane, 1987, p. 1). The efforts of those conflict resolution professionals, generally operating through NGOs and universities, arose from the realization by diplomats and others that formal official government-to-government interactions were not necessarily the most effective methods for securing international cooperation or resolving differences.

Track two diplomacy is unofficial, non- structured interaction. It is always open minded, often altruistic, and . . . strategically optimistic, based on best case analysis. Its underlying assumption is that actual or potential conflict can be

resolved or eased by appealing to common human capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness. Scientific and cultural exchanges are examples of track two diplomacy. The problem most political liberals fail to recognize is that reasonable and altruistic interaction with foreign countries cannot be an alternative to traditional track one diplomacy, with its official posturing and its underlying threat of the use of force. Both tracks are necessary for psychological reasons and both need each other. (Montville & Davidson, 1981, p. 155)

Montville maintains that there are three basic processes in track two diplomacy:

The first consists of facilitated workshops that bring members of conflicting groups together to develop personal relationships and understand the conflict from the perspective of others. The second process involves working to shift public opinion: “Here the task is a psychological one which consists of reducing the sense of victimhood of the parties and rehumanizing the image of the adversary” (McDonald & Bendahmane, 1987, p. 10). The third task is for people to come together to jointly develop strategies for solving the conflict. Methods for conducting these activities are still evolving as is the thinking around which individuals, representing various roles and functions in society and government, should be included.

Montville points out that “there is no evidence that conflict resolution workshops would work for the principal political leaders themselves—perhaps because they are too tough or even impervious to the humanizing process” (McDonald & Bendahmane, 1987, p. 14). Ambassador McDonald seconds this assumption but feels that it is merely because the leaders are stuck in rigid roles and politically have less access to fluidity than individuals further removed from the top echelon of government (McDonald, Sep 2003 - Aug 2004).

In 1986 Ambassador John McDonald and Diane Bendahmane wrote *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy* (1987) compiling the thoughts of several Track One and Track Two professionals confirming the need for government to support, encourage, and work with Track Two. The Department of State refused to print the book for eighteen months since the Department has a strong defensiveness regarding its right, ability, and authority to conduct conflict resolution. However, the book was finally published in 1987.

The official government apparatus for analyzing international security issues and designing foreign policy has to equip itself to support and benefit from track two diplomacy. As part of the process, government analysts must improve their capabilities to understand how history, society, culture, and psychology interact. (Montville & Davidson, 1981, p. 156-7)

Apparently the State Department has listened, at least a little. At a special briefing for representatives of Nongovernmental Organizations, the U.S. Department of State's Deputy Director for Political Affairs in the Office of Iraq presented a plea for help from NGOs (Paul Sutphin, 2004). Acting under Secretary Powell's initiative and authority, the State Department's Iraqi analysts explained their frustrations in conducting dialogue, developing grassroots relationships, and rebuilding infrastructure. Far from admitting that the State Department was limited in its right, ability, and authority to conduct conflict resolution, they admitted that they couldn't spend money fast enough to rebuild Iraq in time to appease the Iraqi's and needed help to do it. This may not be the ideal situation in terms of NGO and State Department cooperation.

Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy was published in 1991 as an Occasional Paper (McDonald), and as a chapter in *Timing the De-Escalation of*

International Conflicts (Kriesberg & Thorson, 1991). And in 1996 Dr. Louise Diamond (a former Union learner) and Ambassador McDonald published *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. By now the model had been more robustly developed and the original second track had been expanded into nine tracks as illustrated in figure two. The concept of multi-track diplomacy is meant to convey the idea that all sectors of society are important and need to be involved, supported, listened to, and trained in a shared language of dialogue, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding in order to prevent or end violent conflict.

**The IMTD logo illustrates
the systemic nature of the nine tracks in
the multi-track systems approach to peace.**




Figure 2: Multi-Track Diplomacy

(Courtesy Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy)

Ambassador McDonald and the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy developed the following principles of multi-track diplomacy:

Twelve Principle of Multi-Track Diplomacy

1. Relationship—Building strong interpersonal and intergroup relations throughout the fabric of society.
2. Long-term commitment—Making an ongoing commitment to people and to processes that may take years to come to fruition.
3. Cultural synergy—Respecting the cultural wisdom of all the parties and welcoming the creative interaction of different cultural ways.
4. Partnership—Modeling collaborative process by partnering with local parties and with other institutions and coalitions.
5. Multiple technologies—Utilizing a variety of technologies, as appropriate, and creating new methods, as needed, to meet the unique needs of each situation.
6. Facilitation—Assisting parties in taking responsibility for their own dreams and destiny.
7. Empowerment—Helping people become empowered agents of change and transformation within their societies.
8. Action research—Learning from all that we do and sharing that learning with others.
9. Invitation—Entering the system where there is an invitation and an open door.
10. Trust—Building relationships of mutual trust and caring within the system.
11. Engagement—Acknowledging that once we enter a system we become a unique part of it: an engaged, caring, and accountable partner.

12. Transformation—Catalyzing changes at the deepest level of beliefs, assumptions, and values, as well as behaviors and structures. (Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2004)

Governance, Development, Security, Sovereignty, and Socio-Political Psychology

Prevention is the worst possible option, except for all the others.
(Jorgensen, 2003)

Conflict, both its sources and resolution, is inseparable from issues of governance, development, security, sovereignty, as well as social, political, and personal psychology. Robert Kaplan, political pundit, conflict scholar, and journalist for the *Atlantic Monthly*, maintains that “Good governance can emerge only from a sly understanding of men’s passions” (2002, p. 87). That understanding reveals a clear link between global development, war, and terrorism:

Today’s warriors come often from the hundreds of millions of unemployed young males in the developing world, angered by the income disparities that accompany globalization. Globalization is Darwinian.⁴ It means economic survival of the fittest—those groups and individuals that are disciplined, dynamic, and ingenious will float to the top, while cultures that do not compete well technologically will produce an inordinate number of warriors. . . . An age of chemical and biological weapons is perfectly suited for religious martyrdom.
(Kaplan, 2002, p. 119)

⁴ The term Darwinian is used in the quote and throughout this paper to refer to the widely accepted interpretation of Darwin—survival of the fittest—even though Darwin’s actual thinking differed somewhat from this position.

In an article called “No Country Left Behind,” former US Secretary of State Colin Powell maintains that “no country should be left behind in development” (2005, p. 28). Summarizing Bush administration policy on the relationship between development and terrorism, Secretary Powell explains:

We see development, democracy, and security as inextricably linked. We recognize that poverty alleviation cannot succeed without sustained economic growth, which requires that policymakers take seriously the challenge of good governance. At the same time, new and often fragile democracies cannot be reliably sustained, and democratic values cannot be spread further, unless we work hard and wisely at economic development. And no nation, no matter how powerful, can assure the safety of its people as long as economic desperation and injustice can mingle with tyranny and fanaticism. (2005, p. 30)

Powell sees “development, democracy, and security as inextricably linked” and yet in the following paragraph denies any “direct” link between poverty and terrorism, a denial which is a grave threat to development, democracy, and security.

Development is not a “soft” policy issue, but a core national security issue. Although we see a link between terrorism and poverty, we do not believe that poverty directly causes terrorism. Few terrorists are poor. The leaders of the September 11 group were all well-educated men, far from the bottom rungs of their societies. Poverty breeds frustration and resentment, which ideological entrepreneurs can turn into support for—or acquiescence to—terrorism, particularly in those countries in which poverty is coupled with a lack of political rights and basic freedoms. (Powell, 2005, p. 30)

The implication here is that the terrorist’s agenda exists independently of the conditions of social injustice and oppression that create or maintain the poverty and yet Powell admits that:

The root cause of poverty is social injustice and the bad government that abets it. Poverty arises and persists where corruption is endemic and enterprise is stifled, where basic fairness provided by the rule of law is absent. In such circumstances, poverty is an assault against human dignity, and in that assault lies the natural seed of human anger. . . . The United States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and political roots of poverty. (Powell, 2005, p. 30-1)

<i>Global Trends in Freedom</i>								
	Free Countries		Partially Free Countries		Not-Free Countries			
1973	44	29%	42	28%	65	43%		
1983	53	32%	56	33%	58	35%		
1993	72	38%	63	33%	55	29%		
2003	88	46%	55	29%	49	25%		
	By Population							
2003	2.773B	44%	1.356B	17%	2.210B	39%		
2004	2.812B	44%	1.220B	19%	2.387B	37%		

Table 3: Global Trends in Freedom (Freedom House, 2005a, 2005b)⁵

Daisaku Ikeda, a Japanese Buddhist scholar of peace and founder of Soka Gakkai International,⁶ supports Powell’s “soft” approach of fighting the war on terrorism through

⁵ “Russia entered the ranks of Not Free countries in 2004 for the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union” (Freedom House, 2005a, p. 1). This caused the increase in people living in not free countries in 2004.

economic development in Soka Gakkai International's 2004 Peace Proposal, "Inner Transformation: Creating a Global Groundswell for Peace:"

What must be done to forestall the risk, inherent in the essential asymmetry of a "war" against terrorism, that it will become a deadly quagmire? Since it is probably unrealistic to expect self-restraint on the part of the terrorists, those who oppose them must put priority on the exercise of self-mastery—a quality that grows from the effort to consider and understand the position of the "other." This effort must take precedence over the use of hard power. Equally essential are the courage and vision to address the underlying conditions of poverty and injustice that are enabling factors in terrorism. (2004)

Unfortunately, programs of economic development often fail to benefit the intended recipients. Nor does democracy itself ensure successful development.

There is a tendency to romanticize terrorists as being freedom fighters who selflessly fight western imperialism in defense of the down trodden masses. However, radical Islamic terrorists are responsible for 7 out of 8 deaths from terrorism (55% not counting 9/11) that have occurred in democratic nations within the past five years and 70% of those fatalities were caused by terrorists originating in not-free countries. (Freedom House, 2005a, p. 8). While the agendas and motivations of terrorists are often unclear, what is clear is that the oppression and poverty in their own countries is highly correlated to their acts. "Moreover, terrorists from dictatorial and repressive societies that brutalize

⁶ Soka Gakkai International (SGI) is a Buddhist association with more than 12 million members in 190 countries and territories worldwide.

their inhabitants are themselves significantly more brutal than terrorists born and acculturated in democratic societies” (Freedom House, 2005a, p. 9).

President Fidel V. Ramos was president of the Republic of the Philippines from 1992 to 1998. Prior to winning the presidency, he was involved in the People's Power Revolution of 1986. While serving as president he introduced a comprehensive Social Reform Agenda, leading the Philippine economy to grow dramatically. He stresses the symbiotic connection between democracy and human development:

Since my early years as an infantry captain in the 1950s, I have come to realize that the symbiotic connection between democracy and human development is quite complex. Democracy does not automatically ensure development, and neither does sustained development reliably guarantee people's freedom. Yet, democracy does reinforce human development, and human development strengthens democracy. The two reinforce each other. (Ramos, 2003)

Powell claims that “Our true aim is to eradicate poverty by challenging the leaderships of developing countries to take their nations’ futures into their own hands” (Powell, 2005, p 31). It then follows that the US must be committed to supporting human development as well as economic development, democracy, and security if it is to end terrorism and war. Furthermore, it follows that it would help the US to further these goals if US policy and the practice of its leaders and representatives demonstrated concern for the welfare of others in all levels of dialogue and negotiation.

These assumptions regarding conflict must be carried through at the practitioner levels. The following scenario describes a situation wherein a senior practitioner’s metaskill clearly did not demonstrate concern for the welfare of others:

Signals of rank imbalance and complex roles are often evident in photographs. In 1998 a picture was published throughout the world showing the IMF's Managing Director "a short, neatly dressed former French Treasury bureaucrat... standing with a stern face and crossed arms over the seated and humiliated president of Indonesia. The hapless president was being forced, in effect, to turn over economic sovereignty of his country to the IMF in return for the aid his country needed. In the end, ironically, much of the money went not to help Indonesia but to bail out the "colonial power's" private sector creditors. (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 40-1)

One might wonder whether the imposition of this one-sided and expensive "bail out" contributed to the demise of Indonesia's stability and economic recovery. Ongoing problems in Indonesia include: widespread poverty, terrorism, transition to democratically elected governments after four decades of authoritarianism, banking reform, cronyism and corruption, human rights violations, and armed separatist movements (CIA, 2004). "Indonesia has suffered great upheaval since 1998—the year of the "bail out"—resulting in demonstrations and armed conflict" (Lonely Planet, 2004). The discrepancy between stated US policy goals and the actual consequences of US policy not only enflames anti-US sentiment, but also demonstrates a marked lack of empathy for others.

Some maintain that anti-US terrorism is, in part, caused by the lack of openness on the part of US policy to the experience and suffering of others. Development itself, while seen by some as being a major key to large scale conflict resolution, has not yet been shown to be a viable way to end poverty, social injustice, or employ the hundreds of millions of young, enraged, disenfranchised, and disenchanting men and women who may become warriors and terrorists because of what economists call structural frictions. One long

standing assumption in capitalism is that the best way to help the poor is to grow the economy and wait for the benefits to trickle-down. Joseph Stiglitz, Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton and Chief Economist and Senior VP at the World Bank, maintains that this *trickle-down* theory was never more than a “belief,” something less than a hypothesis (2003). Also, huge rank imbalances often make it easy to be one sided assuming that all of the power is in the hands of one side and seeing the other side as the victim.

The IMF, of course, claims that it never dictates but always negotiates the terms of any loan agreement with the borrowing country. But these are one-sided negotiations in which all the power is in the hands of the IMF, largely because many countries seeking IMF help are in desperate need of funds. (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 42)

Stiglitz presents a strong case for the insensitivity of the IMF, the World Bank, and US policy towards the interests of the citizens in developing nations, an insensitivity which he describes as a “failure to be sensitive to the broader social context” (2003, p. 73). But what is the broader social context and how does it relate to conflict resolution? Stiglitz argues that there is a social contract involving fairness that binds citizens together and to their government (2003, p. 78). This contract is key to conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. It is the basis for the sense of injustice that creates terrorism and enflames war.

Amartya Sen, Nobel prize winning economist, clarifies the definition of development beyond that of increased GNP:

Development can be seen, it is argued here, as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with

narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social modernization.

Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states. Despite unprecedented increases in overall opulence, the contemporary world denies elementary freedoms to vast numbers—perhaps even the majority—of people. (Sen, 2000, p. 3-4)

Good governance is required for development to further the removal of major sources of unfreedom. The US Agency for International Development's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance reports:

In a statistical study of over 160 cases of internal conflict, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2002) find a significant negative correlation between democracy and civil war. Similarly, Ted Gurr (1994) shows that in democracies, ethno-political groups are far more likely to express dissatisfaction through peaceful protest rather than through violence. Finally, using World Bank measures of good governance Hugh Miall (2001) finds that 70% of countries that score well experience no violence, whereas only 37% of countries with bad governance remain free from conflict. (Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation, 2004)

More recently, "good governance" has been identified as a structural preventor of internal conflict. Policy makers and NGOs alike are pursuing the aim of improving governance, particularly in developing countries, as a means of

reducing poverty, improving development in general, and preventing conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Indeed, the promotion of good governance is seen as a critical element in promoting conflict prevention and conflict management (European Commission 2001). Is “good governance” a deep preventor of ethnic conflict? . . . In an effort to address this question, indicators of good governance derived from the World Bank were used in conjunction with Minorities at Risk data. (Miall, 2001, p. 10)

Results of the study, applied to 113 countries, are shown below:

	<i>No violence</i>	<i>Small-scale violence</i>	<i>Large-scale violence</i>
Good Governance	26 (70%)	10 (27%)	2 (5%)
Fair Governance	17 (45%)	16 (42%)	5 (13%)
Bad Governance	14 (37%)	12 (32%)	11 (29%)

Table 4: Incidence of Violent Ethnic Conflict in 1995-8 in 113 countries, by Quality of Governance

(Miall, 2001, p. 12)

Results are based on measuring six dimensions of the quality of governance, defined by the World Bank:

Voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. . . . Each of these six governance research indicators combines a large number of underlying measures of perceptions of governance. In the 2000/01 indicator, we drew on 194 separate measures compiled by 17 different sources obtained from a variety of international organizations, survey institutes, risk-rating agencies, and think-tanks. (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002, p. 2).

There may be some circularity in the findings. Political stability, for example, is also highly correlated with longevity of governance for both democracies and autocracies. The risk of internal instability is highest during and after changes in system of governance (McDonald, Sep 2003 - Aug 2004). Voice and accountability, while difficult to define, are not only attributes of good governance, but also correlated with civil unrest.

With so much evidence backing the need for change, and a strong force of activists working globally to ensure that change happens, the tide is turning. The US government, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank have changed their rhetoric and now talk about poverty. Stiglitz maintains that many critics are skeptical that there is any real commitment to change: “They see the changes as simply the institution’s facing the political reality that they must change...” (2003, p. 215), which is very different than a serious commitment to change.

Process work provides a framework of analysis of the roles comprised in these social dynamics that can help to explain and predict various reactions to foreign and monetary policy. Social forces in favor of change can also be viewed as roles. In “Listen or Die: The Terrorist as a Role,” political psychologist Dr. Alexandra Vassiliou maintains that terrorism is itself a role:

The role of the terrorist is the role of the person who adopts a behavior and communication style that is rebellious, challenging, disrupting, and threatening. These aspects of their behavior can be seen in both the content and the style of their communication. . . . Typically, when a person experiences herself as a terrorist, she is working for her highest ideals and sense of justice; she also may be gaining vengeance for present and past wrongs. People in the terrorist role . . . will

break accepted group communication styles and safety rules in order to force a group to accept their unpopular opinions. . . . (Vassiliou, 1995, p. 64-5)

There is evidence that development will continue to exclude underprivileged minorities from a meaningful level of engagement in society. The skeptics mentioned by Stiglitz, for example, and the misleading one-sidedness of Secretary's Powell's statements on terrorism that seem to imply that the agenda of terrorists is unrelated to the poverty and suffering of those they engage. Statement's from an authority figure such as Secretary Powell are particularly inflammatory when they exclude the experience of minorities.

The main privilege of belonging to a mainstream group is not having to be aware of how one excludes the minority. . . . Social institutions including the media, education, government, corporate institutions, and advertising promote the values, culture, and images of white, middle-class America, effectively annihilating the reality of those who are not part of that culture. This centrality, dominance, and ethnocentricity of the mainstream is a privilege that makes others resentful.

Working with social conflict means educating the mainstream about its privilege. (Summers, 1994, P. 62)

This view, from social psychologist Gemma Summers, suggests that, while great advances have been made to determine the causes of conflict, to address poverty, and to promote development, that the root cause of a great deal of conflict will remain hidden from public debate and awareness for some time unless further shifts occur. Fortunately, it isn't only acts of terror that are speaking to the need for these shifts.

There is a solid foundation for the relevance of social and political psychological thought to the study of conflict. For example, one of the early successes of political

psychology came at the end of World War II. At that time US policy makers had limited experience with psychological advice but benefited from anthropologist Ruth Benedict's recommendation that the United States allow Japanese Emperor Hirohito to remain on the throne, if only in a ceremonial capacity.

She accurately perceived that to depose and perhaps even execute the emperor would completely humiliate the Japanese and deprive them of symbolic identity as a people. The German experience after World War I had shown that a people suffering complete humiliation—the thorough loss of dignity and self-respect—may seek revenge against the authors of the loss. By following Benedict's advice, the United States laid the groundwork for its current strong alliance with Japan, a relationship that has flourished despite the U.S. nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Montville & Davidson, 1981, p. 146)

Political and social psychology have made great advances since WWII. However, efforts to educate the mainstream have lagged. Also, think tanks and large institutions such as the US government, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, and the policy analysts who drive them find it easier to focus on quantitative and impersonal measures for perhaps the same reasons that Carl Jung remarked, “One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making the darkness conscious. This procedure, however, is disagreeable, and therefore not very popular”. (Jung, 1968) Martin Luther King, Jr.’s thinking parallels this sentiment when he, speaking of the tragedy of injustice, wrote:

History is the long and tragic story of the fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but ... groups are more immoral than

individuals. We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given; it must be demanded by the oppressed. (1986, p. 292)

Further, he poses that there is a need for the work accomplished by the role of the terrorist, but calls for it to be accomplished nonviolently.

Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, we must see the need of having nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men to rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. (1986, p. 291)

One view places the burden of nonviolence on the social change agent, while others would ask the mainstream, its leaders, and its agents, to listen more carefully so that the need for the change agent to “turn up the volume” will not be felt. However, as C.G. Jung observed, this procedure is disagreeable and therefore not very popular. One approach that may help to make the process of self-reflection less disagreeable is coherent dialogue as conceived by David Bohm.

Coherent Dialogue

Just as Dr. King saw the need to “rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal” (1986, p. 291), the physicist David Bohm maintains that our thinking—even the thinking behind what we see as highly evolved systems such as law, democracy, and technology—is itself a problem. Bohm likens our bondage to myths and half-truths to a virus: “. . . thought pervades us. It’s similar

to a virus—somehow this is a disease of thought, of knowledge, of information, spreading all over the world,” and calls for a transformation of the nature of consciousness (2004, p. 58). Bohm likens human thought and consciousness to light. Normal light is chaotic, random, and incoherent, whereas a laser’s light is directed, focused, and coherent. Similarly, human thought and human consciousness is primarily incoherent. People often tend to react to their own bodily responses, defending various thoughts without understanding why and without fully understanding the thought and its consequences. “The natural self-defense impulse, which we got in the jungle, has been transferred from the jungle animals to those opinions” (Bohm, 2004, p. 39). Research in neuroscience confirms Bohm’s theory: the lateral amygdala short-circuits our rational, neo-cortical response and triggers an action even before the threat has been consciously registered (Schafe, Nader, Blair, & LeDoux, 2001) (LeDoux & Muller, 1997).

Bohm maintains that through dialogue and perhaps only through dialogue can people learn to develop coherence in thinking. This is similar to Buckminster Fuller’s views stated in *Critical Path* where he called for the development, reliance on, and necessity of the intuitive wisdom and comprehensive informed-ness of each and every individual (what Bohm calls coherence) as being critical to ensure our continued fitness for survival as a species (1981, p. ix).

Bohm maintains that three things stop us from developing coherence: thought itself, fragmentation, and reaction. Reaction is what happens when someone defends a thought automatically, without taking time to understand more deeply the thought and its consequences and relationship with other thoughts. Reaction is basically defensive (and is believed to be related to the brain’s mechanism in forming memories about unpleasant or

traumatic experiences (LeDoux & Muller, 1997)) and often results in a projection onto others as well as a block that prevents the individual from seeing various patterns in herself:

It seems then that the main trouble is that the other person is the one who is prejudiced and not listening. . . . The very nature of such a “block” is, however, that it is a kind of insensitivity of “anesthesia” about one’s own contradictions. Evidently then, what is crucial is to be aware of the nature of one’s own “blocks.” . . . When we come together to talk, or otherwise to act in common, can each one of us be aware of the subtle fear and pleasure sensations that “block” his ability to listen freely? (Bohm, 2004, p. 5)

The second difficulty, fragmentation, is what happens when we forget that everything is connected. Various fragmenting thoughts become very important ideals over which we fight horrific wars in our homes, at work, and between nations.

One of these difficulties is *fragmentation*, which originates in thought—it is thought which divides everything up. Every division we make is a result of how we think. In actuality, the whole world is shades merging into one. But we select certain things and separate them from others—for convenience, at first. Later we give this separation great importance. (Bohm, 2004, p. 10)

The deepest difficulty has to do with the active nature of thought itself. To a certain extent thought creates reality and has dire consequences. “Fragmentation is one of the difficulties of thought, but there is a deeper root, which is that thought is very active, but the process of thought thinks that it is doing nothing—that it is just telling you the way things are. . . .” (Bohm, 2004, p. 10-11). The whole ecological problem, for example, is due to

thought. Implicit in our thinking has been the belief that the world and its ability to clean up our mistakes and absorb our toxins is infinite.

There is a whole pool of knowledge for the whole human race, like different computers that share a pool of knowledge. This pool of thought has been developing for many thousands of years, and it is full of all sorts of content. This knowledge, or thought, knows all of that content, *but it doesn't know what it is doing*. This knowledge knows itself wrong: it knows itself as doing nothing. It therefore says, "I am not responsible for any of these problems. I'm just here for you to use." (Bohm, 2004, p. 59-60)

In effect, thought does not exist independently of everything else, because thought has consequences. Introducing deep dialogue globally is a large task that clearly is beyond the capacity of the small field of conflict resolution. And yet, it may be the only approach that, ultimately, will work. Bohm, in a sense, begins to simplify the task by pointing out that ". . . practically all the problems of the human race are due to the fact that thought is not proprioceptive" (Bohm, 2004, p. 29). This parallels statements made by Albert Einstein in 1934 in the first of three letters to Friends of Peace:

Small is the number of them that see with their own eyes and feel with their own hearts. But it is their strength that will decide whether the human race must relapse into that state of stupor which a deluded multitude appears today to regard as the ideal.

O that the nations might see, before it is too late, how much of their self-determination they have got to sacrifice in order to avoid the struggle of all against

all! The power of conscience and of the international spirit [both based on thought] has proved itself inadequate. (1954a, p. 108)

Bohm's proprioception, extended to include vision by Einstein, is further extended by Mindell (and others) to include all of the channels of perception (Mindell, 1982, 1989, 1995, 2002a): Coherent thought includes the awareness and congruence of proprioception, vision, hearing, smell, touch, taste, speech, and movement.

Understanding of the relationship between the channels of perception and coherence of thought paves the way for development of a practicable approach to developing coherence *en masse* through dialogue. However, there are many thoughts that are against any one approach and it is unlikely that coherent dialogue will overcome them easily. The difficulties include psychopathology, trauma, ignorance, egoism, nationalism, racism, sexism, and greed.

Much research on the effects of severe psychological stress has focused on stress-related psychopathology. Some argue that war, violence, and extreme conflict are all the result of psychopathology. Further work remains to be done to explore the effectiveness of various approaches such as dialogue, systematic desensitization, positive imaging, movement, energy, body work, and process oriented worldwork on the physiological reactivity of individuals and groups involved in conflict. One thing is clear, "unconscious emotional memories formed by the amygdala and related brain areas can never be converted into conscious memories" if they are not also formed by the hippocampal memory system (LeDoux & Muller, 1997, p. 1725). This is significant because, as is well known in studies of trauma, extreme stress, and psychopathology, there are many factors that can cause emotional memories to be formed unconsciously, without an associated

hippocampal memory (Charney, 2004). That is not to say, however, that the autonomic emotional reactions can not be made conscious and overcome, nor that reactivity, pathological or not, is itself the root of conflict.

Bohm's approach to dialogue involves "suspending" thought. He uses a visual metaphor of holding a thought in front of oneself so that it can be examined and reflected upon, rather than accepted as absolute truth and fought over. William Ury notes that

The polarities turn out to be false polarities. In these questions, there are no absolutes; everything is a matter of degree. In seeing only absolutes, one misses the critical degrees, yet it is in these degrees that lie the answers to the questions of how humanity has gotten along in the past and how we can get along in the future. (Ury, 1999, p. 51)

Ury has researched indigenous methods of conflict resolution in various settings. Amongst the Semai people in the Malaysian rain forest, for example, when conflict emerges, "people zealously seek to avoid taking sides" (1999, p. 6). And the Kua Bushman will talk and talk and talk for days until the problem is completely worked through. If someone leaves, they bring her back. If she won't come, the whole group goes to her and continues the talking. Every conflict takes place within a third party—the community. It is this third party that provides the facilitation and the structure of containment for the work of dialogue.

There is a trend towards third party or community intervention in the US, appearing in the form of peer mediation training in public schools, shelters for women and children, crisis lines, town meetings, independent media, and open dialogue. "Unlike the ultimate arbiter in the form of a king or authoritarian state, the third side is not a

transcendent individual or institution who dominates all, but rather the *emergent will of the community*” (Ury, 1999, p. 14). That *emergent will* changes over time. It is a *timespirit* (Mindell, 1995, p. 42), something akin to the *zeitgeist*, but which suggests that something active is happening in the background, as if certain changes in society are trying to happen. For example, there is an oft used expression whose quaintness hides the brutality of its etymology. In colonial New England there was a “rule of thumb,” which described the size of a stick that a man could use to beat his wife. Anything larger was thought to be excessively brutal but sticks the size of his thumb or less were acceptable and presumably understandable given the spirit of the times. Feminism and the reaction against sexism and against violence towards women is an example of a timespirit: the *emergent will* of the people that will no longer tolerate gender violence. Similar timespirits are driving the trend towards democracy and dialogue. It was a timespirit against racism that caused the world to support the anti-apartheid efforts in South Africa.

“You must believe,” declared South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, “that this spectacular victory [over apartheid] would have been totally, totally impossible had it not been that we were supported so remarkably by the international community” (Ury, 1999, p. 18).

The international community—playing the role of the third party, outsiders in the sense of being outside of South Africa, and insiders in the sense that racism is a global problem effecting us all—fills the role of the conscience of South Africa. Zealously seeking to avoid taking sides, that conscience supported both white and blacks to change.

Efforts to unfold time-spirits and create coherent community through dialogue do not involve a linear path. As previously mentioned, in his last book, *Critical Path*, R.

Buckminster Fuller maintains that there is a critical path (referring to critical-path project management analysis) leading towards, or away from, our continued fitness for survival as a species. Classical international relations and conventional conflict resolution theory and praxis see this path as being linear but Fuller maintains that it is not:

Conventional critical-path conceptioning is linear and self-under-informative. Only spherically expanding and contracting, spinning, polarly involuting and evolving orbital-system feedbacks are both comprehensively and incisively informative. Spherical-orbital critical=feedback circuits are pulsative, tidal, importing and exporting. Critical-path elements are not overlapping linear modules in a plane: they are systemically interspiraling complex of omni-interrelevant regenerative feedback circuits. (1981, p. vi)

Efforts to address conflict, dialogue, and community involve global issues and effect all of humanity. While much of the work, the community dialogue and the local interventions, must happen at the grassroots level, there is also a great need for a great institution, providing leadership and policy in a cohesive spherically expanding and contracting, spinning, polarly involuting and evolving orbital- systematic manner. The United Nations is, despite its many weaknesses and failings, the only structure in existence dedicated to building a global society.

Deep Dialogue and the United Nations

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a report entitled “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-keeping,” a report which has far reaching consequences for the attempt to build a sustainable, nonviolent global society:

The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep. To reach them will require our utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to promote sustainable economic and social development for wider prosperity, to alleviate distress and to curtail the existence and use of massively destructive weapons. . . . I consider: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping—to which I have added a closely related concept, post-conflict peace-building. (Annan, 1992, p. 1-2)

The concept of peace is easy to grasp; that of international security is more complex, for a pattern of contradictions has arisen here as well. As major nuclear powers have begun to negotiate arms reduction agreements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens to increase and conventional arms continue to be amassed in many parts of the world. As racism becomes recognized for the destructive force it is and as apartheid is being dismantled, new racial tensions are rising and finding expression in violence. Technological advances are altering the nature and the expectation of life all over the globe. The revolution in communications has united the world in awareness, in aspiration and in greater solidarity against injustice. But progress also brings new risks for stability: ecological damage, disruption of family and community life, greater intrusion into the lives and rights of individuals. (Annan, 1992, p. 3)

Towards this end, Annan proposed the following goals for the UN:

Our aims must be:

- To seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence results;
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have led to conflict;
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to the work of this Organization. (Annan, 1992, p. 3-4)

Since the collapse of the European empires, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, the nature of violent conflict has shifted predominantly to intrastate conflicts: conflicts over which the UN, the only structure in existence dedicated to building a global society, has no jurisdiction. Annan proposed that the time for “absolute and exclusive sovereignty” has passed (1992, p. 4):

The foundation-stone of this work is and must remain the State. Respect for its fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international

progress. The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.

Commerce, communications and environmental matters transcend administrative borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first order of their economic, political and social lives. The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve. (Annan, 1992, p. 4)

The appropriate limits to sovereignty has been extensively discussed by various UN departments, agencies, think tanks, conflict and political scholars since the early 1990s (Hübner, 2000). One proposed amendment to the UN charter would grant authority for UN intervention within sovereign nations if armed ethnic conflict was threatening to overwhelm the nation's resources to cope. UN Security Council Resolution 794 was passed in 1992 authorizing the use of military force to accomplish a humanitarian intervention under Chapter 7 of the Charter (Marks, 2001). Other considerations to appropriate limits to sovereignty include globalization, labor, security, terrorism, energy, water, demographics, environment, fairness, and fears. The political reality of getting UN members, particularly the Security Council members, to agree to an intervention is a very political issue. Speaking to the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization in February of 2004, President Mkapa of Tanzania said,

There is a Chinese proverb that says: “You cannot cover a fire with paper.” It is common sense. . . . The world can no longer hope to cover the fire of discontent with the current process of globalisation with paper. It cannot work. The time to act decisively is upon us. . . . The growing poor of the world feel short-changed if not cheated, and are getting increasingly restive. . . . We can say authoritatively that discontent is pervasive.

At one level we are increasingly interconnected, and at another level we are increasingly drifting apart. This is an untenable situation, and soon a mutually damaging rupture will occur. But we also found out that the vast majority of people desire to be a part of, and to have a stake in the benefits offered by, the globalisation process. . . .

Developing countries are complaining about unfair rules, or fair rules applied unfairly, and see no hope in the face of the current power asymmetry in global governance. Workers in rich industrialised countries are complaining about jobs moving out to China, India and Mexico, to middle income and least developed countries, which countries in turn complain about lack of market access, transfer of technology and labour mobility. Developing countries are demanding the same ladder that rich industrialised countries used to get where they are today. Technology is widening rather than narrowing the skills and productive gap between developed and developing countries. We strived to look at globalisation through the eyes of the people in all societies. We can say authoritatively that discontent is pervasive.

Globalisation has increased our interdependence, and there is no hope of disentangling ourselves. But it has also brought into sharp distinction the imbalances that

exist in our world. And the closer we get to one another the more we see and experience the unfairness of the system, exacerbating underlying political, social, economic and cultural frustrations, uncertainties and in some instances outright anger. For many, desperation is setting in as the sheer scope of present social and economic change appear to outstrip the capacity of national governments or citizens to control, contest or resist the undesirable effects. The limits to national sovereignty and democratic political action, in many countries, are ascribed to globalisation. Countries with impoverished, disadvantaged and desperate populations are potential breeding grounds for present and future terrorists. We cannot cover fire with paper. (President Mkapa, 2004)

The New Warriors

The point is not that the work of developing the capacity for inclusive coherent dialogue can or should be done by the UN, world, national, or organization leaders. It can be done by any of us. Ury calls the people who are doing this the *new warriors* (1999):

- In Rwanda, a Tutsi woman who watched her husband and son hacked to death by a deranged Hutu who was caught up in the madness of the killing, was also attacked by that same man but lived. Years later she was doing truth and reconciliation work in the prisons. She saw him and he saw her and hid. It took her months to get close enough to talk to him. He naturally assumed that she wanted to kill him. Years later, thanks to her efforts and the time and care she spent working with him, he is now free. This man not only returned to the same village where the woman still lives, but they share the same roof. (Watchtower, 2004)
- In Washington, Democratic and Republican Congress people met together on a weekend in March of 1999. The animosity between them had become so bitter that

the Congress couldn't function. They met to improve their working relationships and to transcend party politics. (Ury, 1999, p. 138)

· During the last two centuries, no two liberal representative governments with juridical rights for their citizens have gone to war with each other (Ury, 1999, p. 96).

These are not unrelated acts. They are part of the same trend, the same timespirit. The spirits of deep democracy and new warriorship is growing at a grassroots as well as a global level. Interestingly, the movement is not primarily altruistic; based solely on sacrifice and morality. Rather, it springs from a realization that nonviolence and inclusive coherent dialogue will maximize benefits to all. Similarly, Martin Luther King said that the choice for black Americans struggling against racism during the civil rights movement of the 1960s was between nonviolence and nonexistence (1986). Nelson Mandela, for example, wondered what kind of country would be left for blacks to inherit if they didn't cooperate with the whites (1995). The benefits to both are inextricably linked.

Unlike many other professions, mastery of the skills of new warriorship, deep dialogue, and conflict resolution are intensely personal and require years of practice and a deep personal transformation. However, on a practical and more immediate level, conflict resolution practitioners can improve their ability to understand, facilitate, and transform conflict by discovering all of the roles and the tensions between them both within themselves and in their interpersonal relationships. This is difficult work and requires the determination and attitude of warriorship. There are challenges inherent in exploring these roles and tensions and their associated rank, power, and privilege issues because people often tend to marginalize many signals (nonverbal body cues, linguistics, synchronicities, their own sensory experience, etc.) and ignore the deeper meaning that often lies hidden

behind them. In practice, using conflict as a path of self discovery requires developing an attitude of openness to deep democracy: a belief in the importance of the feelings, experience, and visions of others, which is what it's all about (Mindell, 2002a, 2002b, 2005). John Paul Lederach says, "The journey toward reconciliation is not a path for the weak and feeble. Facing oneself and one's own fears and anxieties demands an outward *and* an inward journey" (1999, p. 24). This is a difficult journey not only for the conflictees, but for the facilitators, meditators, citizen diplomats, and peacebuilders who want to help and ultimately, ideally, for all of us.

The Rules of Sponsorship

- Rule 1: A sponsor should not approach parties to a dispute with a view to facilitating a resolution unless the sponsor can provide facilitators who possess the required training and skills.
- Rule 2: A sponsor should not approach parties to a conflict without being sure it is possible to stay with the situation until the services offered are no longer required.
- Rule 3: At the outset, the first task of a sponsor is to identify, as far as is possible, the parties and issues relevant to the conflict, and their degrees of involvement. This task is to be accomplished prior to initiating any approaches.
- Rule 4: The starting point in the analysis and resolution of any conflict is where the closet relationships have broken down, that is, within parties or between communities within a state. The analysis then moves outward until all parties and issues are dealt with.
- Rule 5: If the sponsor is not in a position to organize more than one seminar series at a time, a list of parties and issues (with some indicate of the order in which they will be addressed) should be communicated to all parties. The communication should clearly point out that no discovered option that affects others will be implemented until there is discussion of it with all concerned.
- Rule 6: All communications to parties should be directly to those involved, and in the cases of large groups, at a leadership or near-leadership level, or at least with the knowledge of leadership.
- Rule 7: Communications should be simultaneous and identical with no issues raised in invitations. Follow-up visits in support of invitations should be confined to a description of the processes and details arrangements.
- Rule 8: Parties should be invited to send participants who are not official representatives, but who have easy access to decision makers.
- Rule 9: The participation of all factions within a party should be sought.
- Rule 10: Parties to disputes must be placed in a direct analytical and nonbargaining dialogue.
- Rule 11: A third party should be present in any dialogue among conflicting parties who are seeking to understand their conflict and to find an agreeable resolution.
- Rule 12: The role of the panel in conflict resolution is not to seek compromises. It is initially to facilitate analysis so that goals and tactics, interests, values, and

needs can be clarified, and later, to help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of the analysis made.

- Rule 13: Panel members should be drawn from several key disciplines, they should be widely informed of different approaches in their own fields, have an adequate knowledge of conflict theories, and be experienced in the facilitation process, so as to help the parties to arrive at an accurate definition of the situation under examination.
- Rule 14: It is necessary to have balanced viewpoints and perspectives represented on the panel, including gender, and where relevant, ethnic and class perspectives.
- Rule 15: The panel should not include persons who have made an exclusive speciality of the particular conflict being analyzed or of the region in which the conflict takes place.
- Rule 16: Endeavors should be made to bridge the traditional explanations of power rivalries and problem-solving approaches by considering all and incorporating the relevant ones into the problem-solving process.
- Rule 17: Panel members must prepare and confer before and during the seminar, even adjourning discussions for this purpose, so that they are always acting together and with mutual understanding.
- Rule 18: Panelists must be selected, not only for their professionalism in facilitation, but also for their talents and abilities to work within a team, and even then, only if they can be available as and when required.
- Rule 19: Sponsors should make reports to the leadership of the parties involved after each workshop series, or at agree-upon stages in the total process.
- Rule 20: Sponsors should give special consideration to the transition stage between the unofficial discussions (which sometimes include participants representing opposition leadership or parties) and the official negotiations, and take whatever steps are required to prepare for this even before viable options have emerged in the seminars.

Preparatory Rules

- Rule 21: The panel should seek from participants specific agreement on what, if any, publicity is desired and generally seek to avoid any dysfunctional consequences of publicity.
- Rule 22: Before approaches are made there should be adequate funds for a first meeting so there are no unnecessary anxieties and savings.
- Rule 23: Participants should be encouraged to organize within their own communities and to contribute to their transport and accommodation costs after the first meeting.
- Rule 24: Reserve funding is necessary so that opportunities are not missed.

- Rule 25: The sponsor must reach agreement with those who are nominating participants on the location of the meeting place, a neutral environment being the main concern.
- Rule 26: Parties should be met separately and housed separately if possible.
- Rule 27: Thought needs to be given in advance to seating arrangements, and changes should be made if, for any reason, the group dynamics require this.
- Rule 28: There should not be any observers nor should there be any provision for recording, even though the parties express no objections. However, appropriate interpreters should be available as required.
- Rule 29: There should be provision for small conference rooms near the main meeting room in which parties can each meet separately.
- Rule 30: The sponsor should ensure that the general environment of the meetings and the comfort of the participants contribute to the facilitated discussions.
- Rule 31: There should be lists circulated of participants and panel members, and clear name displays in front of each.
- Rule 32: Parties should be prepared for the first meeting, know what is expected of them, be aware of the role that will be enacted by the panel, and generally be made to feel comfortable about the process.

The Analytical State

- Rule 33: Participants should be asked not to discuss matters of substance outside the conference room. Coffee breaks, lunches, and other social occasions should be so organized to discourage participants from communicating privately either with other participants or with panel members on matters of substance. Panel members should not communicate with participants separately except on a social basis.
- Rule 34: In its procedures and in its observations and advisements, the panel must keep in mind the reentry problem of the participants.
- Rule 35: The panel acts as a unit in conducting the seminar, with one member acting as the host/hostess and formal chairperson.
- Rule 36: This step-by-step progression from initial perceptions, through analysis of the situation, to evaluation of these perceptions and to finding an agreed-upon definition, to exploration of options that meet the needs of all, should be maintained. However, there should be no fixed agenda of either specific items or timing.
- Rule 37: The panel asks the participants to observe certain rules of procedure and makes it clear that it is the role of the panel to ensure that these are observed, that this is part of the process, and that this control is necessary for the success of the discussions.

- Rule 38: There should be no proposals put forward by any side until the analysis of the situation is complete and a definition of the situation is agreed upon.
- Rule 39: The initial exposition should be heard without interruptions. Following this, only questions of clarification should be asked by participants.
- Rule 40: When the panel asks the participants to make their opening statements, they should ask them to focus on the values and goals at stake in the conflict situation.
- Rule 41: The panel poses questions of clarification, especially in relation to values and goals.
- Rule 42: The panel should prepare (over night probably) a statement of what appear to be shared and unshared values for submission to the participants.
- Rule 43: The panel should allow discussions that help to clarify values to proceed freely, while intervening constantly to ensure that the dialogue remains analytical and does not regress to point-scoring debating exchanges.
- Rule 44: The panel should take the opportunity to communicate any relevant knowledge that will help the participants to interpret what is being said. The panel may refer to other cases of conflict, to research findings on perceptions, and to theories of behavior.
- Rule 45: The panel must be sensitive to audience response for there will be viewpoints and theories that are quickly absorbed because of their relevance, and others that will provoke no response because they are deemed not to be relevant to experience.
- Rule 46: The panel should move the discussion to the key issues once there has been clarity of goals and values. They should ensure that all discussions be kept within the analytical framework that has been established.
- Rule 47: The panel should prepare a statement of the general behavioral propositions that have emerged. This list will be discussed in great detail.
- Rule 48: The panel should prepare a draft statement of agreed-upon propositions. It should be submitted to the participants when the panel feels they are ready to give it their detailed consideration.

The Search for Options

- Rule 49: The panel should help the participants to deduce from the agreed-upon propositions those changes in structures, institutions, and policies that are required to carry agreed-upon propositions into effect and should seek discussion on them.
- Rule 50: Attempts should be made to arrive at some transition steps that pave the way for longer-term solutions.
- Rule 51: The panel must assume a responsibility for putting forward a range of possible options for discussion without putting forward any firm proposals.

Rule 52: Towards the end of the discussions on values, goals, and structures, the panel should make sure to include a preliminary discussion on transitional policies. It should also find out what special seminars may be required in the future.

Reentry and Follow-Up

Rule 53: The panel should ensure adequate time on the last day of a seminar series for discussion of next steps and means of continued communication pending a further meeting.

Rule 54: The panel must be alert to differences arising within parties and provide time for discussion within and between seminar series. If there are conflict factions within the parties, it may be necessary to provide for the facilitation of their conflicts before proceeding with another seminar series.

Rule 55: Each meeting should build on the last so there is a natural progression from analysis of the conflict, to a deduction of the required political structures, to negotiation of the interests involved in making the required changes and to the discussion on policies. Participants should be selected accordingly.

Rule 56: The panel should always have in mind the earliest possible termination of the seminar series, moving as quickly as possible from definition and options to consideration of consequences and implementation.

(Burton, 1996, p. 51-82)

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